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Abstract: This paper proposes a speed-up of a known-plaintext attack on some stream ciphers
based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs). The algorithm consists of two basic steps:
first, to guess the initial seed value of one of the LFSRs, and then to use the resulting binary
sequence in order to deduce useful information about the cipher parameters. In particular, the
proposed divide-and-conquer attack is based on a combination of graph-based techniques with
edit distance concepts. While the original edit distance attack requires the exhaustive search over
the set of all possible initial states of the involved LFSR, this work presents a new heuristic op-
timization that avoids the evaluation of an important number of initial states through the identifi-
cation of the most promising branches of the search graph. The strongest aspects of the proposal
are the facts that the obtained results from the attack are absolutely deterministic, and that many
inconsistent initial states of the target LFSRs are recognized and avoided during search.
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1 Introduction
Stream ciphers are based in the generation of long pseudorandom keystream sequences
from short keys in such a way that it is not possible to rebuild the short keys from the
knowledge of the keystream sequences. This paper deals with stream ciphers based on
Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs), and in special with the Shrinking [Cop 1994]
and the Alternating Step [Gu¨n 1988] generators. The keystream sequences produced by
each generator have high linear complexity, long period and good statistical properties
[Gol 1989].
Attacks on stream ciphers are usually performed under a known-plaintext hypoth-
esis, that is to say, it is assumed that the attacker has direct access to the keystream
output from the generator [Jia 2002]. The computational complexity of such attacks is
then compared with the one of the exhaustive search, and the cipher is said to be bro-
ken if the former is smaller. This theoretical definition might look useless, but in fact is
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very important for the analysis of the security of stream ciphers because it can reveal
weaknesses that might lead to practical attacks.
This paper proposes a deterministic improvement of a known-plaintext three-step
divide-and-conquer attack first proposed in [Gol 1991] by means of a theoretical model
and a distance function known as Levenshtein or edit distance. The three steps of the
attack are:
1. Guess the initial state of an LFSR component of the generator.
2. Try to determine the other variables of the cipher based on the intercepted keystream.
3. Check that the guess was consistent with observed keystream sequence.
This work proposes an approach that may be seen as an extension of the constrained
edit distance attack to clock-controlled LFSR-based generators presented in [Kan 2003]
and generalized in [Cab 2005]. Our main goal here is to investigate whether the number
of initial states that have to be analyzed can be reduced. This feature was pointed out
in [Gol 1998] as one of the most interesting problems in the cryptanalysis of stream
ciphers.
According to the original method, the attacker needs to traverse an entire search tree
including all the possible LFSR initial states. However, in this work the original attack
is improved by simplifying the search tree in such a way that only the most efficient
branches are retained. In order to achieve such a goal, cut sets are defined in certain
graphs that are here used to model the original attack. This new approach produces
a significant improvement in the computing time of the original edit distance attack
since it implies a dramatic reduction in the number of initial states that need to be
evaluated. This quantitative improvement is well established through implementation
for the specific cases of Shrinking and Alternating Step Generators. Furthermore, it is
remarkable that, unlike previous attacks, the results obtained with the proposal of his
work are fully deterministic.
The structure of the present work is as follows. Section 2 introduces basic defini-
tions of Shrinking and Alternating Step Generators and essential concepts regarding
edit distances. In Section 3, some ideas for an efficient initial state selection method are
given that allow describing a method for deducing a threshold value for the computa-
tion of the edit distance. Section 4 presents the full description of the proposed attack.
Finally, Section 5 contains specific details for the cases of Shrinking and Alternating
Generators and Section 6 provides some results from experimental implementations.
Finally, some conclusions and open questions complete the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Shrinking and Alternating Step Generators
The Shrinking Generator (SG) is a nonlinear combinator based on two LFSRs, intro-
duced in 1993 by Coppersmith, Krawczyk and Mansour [Cop 1994]. In this generator
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the bits produced by one LFSR, denoted by S, are used to determine whether the cor-
responding bits generated by the second LFSR, denoted by A, are used as part of the
overall keystream or not.
The Alternating Step Generator (ASG) is a nonlinear combinator based on three
LFSRs, proposed in 1987 by Gu¨nther [Gu¨n 1988]. According to this generator each bit
produced by one of the three LFSRs, denoted by S, is used to determine the output from
the other two LFSRs A and B. In this work we use a modified and equivalent version
of the original ASG defined as follows. If S produces a 1, then the output bit of the
generator is the output bit from the LFSR A, which is clocked. Otherwise, if S produces
a 0, then the output bit of the generator is the output bit from the LFSR B, which is
clocked.
The notation used within this work is as follows. The lengths of the LFSRs S, A
and B are denoted respectively by LS, LA and LB. Their characteristic polynomials are
respectively PS(x), PA(x) and PB(x), and the sequences they produce are denoted by
{si}, {ai} and {bi}. The output keystream is {z j}.
Both generators have been the object of many different attacks during the last years
[Ekd 2003] [Mol 2004] [Zen 2004] [Eng 2006] [Jun 2006] [Kha 2007] [Gom 2008].
However, despite the simplicity of their design and the high number of attacks, both
generators remain being considered remarkably resistant to practical cryptanalysis be-
cause there is no known attack that may be considered efficient enough when the LFSRs
are too long for exhaustive search. Indeed, each of the above references may be de-
scribed either as a theoretical attack because it requires hard hypothesis and the obtained
results are probabilistic, or as an attack launched only against the hardware implemen-
tation of the generator.
2.2 Edit Distance
The edit or Levenshtein distance is the minimum number of elementary operations (in-
sertions, deletions and substitutions) required to transform one sequence X of length N
into another sequence Y of length M, where M ≤ N. Some applications of the edit dis-
tance are file checking, spell correction, plagiarism detection, molecular biology and
speech recognition. The dynamic programming approach (like the shortest-distance
graph search and Viterbi algorithm) is a classical solution for computing the edit dis-
tance matrix where the distances between prefixes of the sequences are successively
evaluated until the final result is achieved.
When applying an edit distance attack on a clock-controlled stream cipher, the ob-
jective is to compute the initial state of a target LFSR that is a component of the attacked
generator. As in Viterbi search, this problem has the property that the shortest path to a
state is always part of any solution of which such a state is part. We will be able to see
this fact quite clearly by the formalization of the algorithm as a search through a graph.
When a restriction exists on a maximum number of times that the register may be
clocked before an output bit is produced, clock-controlled registers are said to work
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with constrained clocking. For these registers, attacks based on a so-called constrained
edit distance have been proposed and analyzed in [Gol 1991]. In this work, two different
possible models for the attacked generator, shown respectively in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, are
considered. In both cases it is assumed that the feedback polynomial of the target LFSR
is known.
In the first model it is assumed that Y = {yn} is an intercepted keystream segment of
length M, which is seen as a noisy decimated version of a segment X = {x n} of length
N produced by a target LFSR. On the other hand, according to the second model, it is
assumed that X = {xn} is an intercepted keystream segment of length N, which is seen
as a noisy widened version of a segment Y = {yn} of length M produced by a target
LFSR. In this latter case, insertions in the sequence Y are indicated by two sequences
S and B so that S points the locations where the bits of B must be inserted. The sim-
plest examples represented by these theoretical models are SG and ASG, respectively.
Furthermore, in both cases it is not necessary to consider noise to model the generator.
Figure 1: Theoretical model with decimations
According to these theoretical models, the main objective of the attack is to deduce
some initial state of the target LFSR that allows producing an intercepted keystream
sequence through decimation or insertion, respectively, without knowing the decimation
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Figure 2: Theoretical model with insertions
or insertion sequences. In either case, the attack is considered successful if only a few
initial states are identified.
Note that the use of these models implies that the known-plaintext attack is applica-
ble not only to those generators that fit exactly such a model but also to other sequences
produced by more complex generators that generalize the given description. In this latter
case, the attack would provide a simpler equivalent description of the original attacked
generator.
An essential step in the edit distance attacks is the computation of edit distance ma-
trices W = (wi, j), i = 0,1, . . . ,N −M, j = 1,2, . . . ,M associated each one with a couple
of sequences X and Y where Y is the intercepted keystream sequence and X is a LFSR
sequence produced by one possible initial state.
It is remarkable the fact that the computation of the edit distance matrix requires
choosing between both models the one that better fits the attacked generator. If it is the
first model, the intercepted sequence is Y while X is the candidate sequence. Otherwise,
if it is the second model, then the intercepted sequence is X while Y is the candidate
sequence. Also note that from the computation of the edit distance between X and Y , the
edit sequences that are computed in the first case correspond to decimation sequences
while in the second case they correspond to insertion sequences.
Some of the parameters of such a matrix are described below. Firstly, its dimension
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is (N−M+1) ·M. Furthermore, its last column gives the edit distance between X and Y
thanks to the value mini=0,...,N−M{wi,M +N−M− i}. Lastly, each element of the matrix
but the last column wi, j, i = 0, . . . ,N −M, j = 1, . . . ,M−1 corresponds exactly to the
edit distance between prefix sub-sequences x1,x2, . . . ,xi+ j and y1,y2, . . . ,y j. The edit
distance between prefix sub-sequences x1,x2, . . . ,xi+M and Y are given by wi,M +N −
M− i, i = 0, . . . ,N−M.
In the edit distance attack here analyzed only deletions and substitutions are al-
lowed. Consequently, each element wi, j of the edit distance matrix W may be recur-
sively computed from the elements of the previous columns according to the formulas
in Equation (1), which depend exclusively on the coincidence or difference between the
two bits xi+ j and y j.
wi,1 = Pi(xi+1,y1), i = 0, . . . ,N−M
w0, j = w0, j−1 +P0(x j,y j), j = 2, . . . ,M
wi, j = mink=0,...,i{wi−k, j−1 +Pk(xi+ j,y j)}, i = 1, . . . ,N−M, j = 2, . . . ,M
Pk(xi+ j,y j) =
{
k i f xi+ j = y j
k+1 i f xi+ j = y j ,k = 0, ..., i
(1)
Pk(xi+ j,y j) gives the cost of the deletion of k bits previous to xi+ j plus its substitu-
tion by its complementary if xi+ j = y j. Note that a maximum length k of possible runs
of decimations is assumed for constrained edit distance matrices. It is also remarkable
that at each stage the minimum has to be obtained in order to extend the search at a next
stage, which implies the need to maintain a record of the search in the same way that
Viterbi algorithm saves a back pointer to the previous state on the maximum probability
path.
2.3 Graph-Based Approach
In order to avoid the computation of the edit distances for all possible initial sequences,
in this paper we propose a graph-theoretic approach so that the computation of edit
distances may be seen as a search through a basic graph. Such a basic graph, shown in
Fig. 3, is a directed graph where each vertex denoted by (i+ j, j), i = 0,1, ,N−M; j =
1,2, ,M, indicates a correspondence between the bits x i+ j and y j and each edge indicates
either a deletion of the bit xi+ j when j = 0, or a possible transition due to a deletion
(D) or a substitution (S), in the remaining cases. In this way, the computation of edit
distances consists in finding the shortest paths through such a graph.
For the description of our improvement, we define a weighted directed graph, here
called induced graph, where the costs of shortest paths come directly from the elements
of the matrix W . This induced graph is computed from the basic graph shown in Fig. 3
as follows. If we eliminate vertical edges in the graph of Fig. 3 by computing the partial
transitive closure of every pair of edges of the form ((i+ j−2, j−1),(i+ j−1, j−1))
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Figure 3: Basic graph
and ((i+ j−1, j−1),(i+ j, j)) and substituting them by the edge ((i+ j−2, j−1),(i+
j, j)), we get the graph shown in Fig. 4, which is here called induced graph.
In this graph there are as many vertices as elements in the matrix W , plus an ad-
ditional source and an additional sink. On the other hand, the directed edges in this
induced graph are defined from the computation of the edit distances described in Equa-
tion (1), plus additional edges joining the source with the vertices associated to the first
column of W and additional edges joining the vertices associated to the last column of
W with the sink.
For instance, the induced graph corresponding to a constrained edit distance matrix
with runs of decimations of maximum length 1 has (N−M+1) · (2M−N+2) vertices
and 2 · (N −M+1) · (2M−N +2)−M−3 edges. Moreover, as described in Equation
(1), the edges in the induced graph have different costs depending on the specific pair of
sequences X and Y , and, in particular, on the coincidences between the corresponding
bits of both sequences. Note that in the induced graph, the shortest paths between the
source and the sink provide us with the solution of the cryptanalytic attack through the
specification of both the decimation and the noise sequences that can be extracted from
them.
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Figure 4: Induced graph
Example : For an intercepted keystream sequence Y :1010111 of length M=7 and a
candidate sequence X :1001011111 of length N=10, the constrained edit distance matrix
with runs of decimations of maximum length 1 is:
W =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0 0 1 2 3 − −
2 1 1 1 1 1 −
− 4 3 3 2 2 2
− − 5 5 4 3 3
⎞
⎟⎟⎠.
The graph induced by this matrix is shown in Fig. 5 where there are exactly 24
vertices and 38 edges of which the ones belonging to the 12 shortest paths between the
source and the sink are remarked in bold.
For each one of those 12 optimal paths, we obtain a possible solution to the crypt-
analysis. The computation of 12 decimation sequences S may be deduced from the
above graphical representation in the following way. A horizontal edge in an optimal
path is interpreted as a 0 in a deduced decimation sequence (that is to say, no deletion
of the corresponding bit) whereas each oblique edge in the path gives a 1 and a 0 as two
decimation bits (corresponding to the deletion of one bit).
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Figure 5: Shortest paths
S = {sn} :
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0010000101 : Solution1
0010001001 : Solution2
0010001010 : Solution3
0010010001 : Solution4
0010010010 : Solution5
0010010100 : Solution6
0100000101 : Solution7
0100001001 : Solution8
0100001010 : Solution9
0100010001 : Solution10
0100010010 : Solution11
0100010100 : Solution12
3 Pruning Search Graphs
The main idea behind the method shown in this Section comes directly from the asso-
ciation between bits xi+ j and edges of the induced graph. Since the calculation of the
minimum edit distance implies the computation of some shortest path in such a graph,
cut sets between the source and the sink in the induced graph may be useful in order
to define a set of conditions for candidate sequences so that it is possible to establish
a minimum threshold edit distance. In this way, once an intercepted sequence fulfills
some of those stated conditions, the cost of the corresponding cut set can be guaranteed
to be minimal for some possible candidate sequence, what has direct consequences on
the costs of the shortest paths, that is to say, on the edit distances.
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In this way, as soon as an intercepted sequence fulfills some specific condition de-
fined below, and this fact allows the description of a candidate and feasible initial se-
quence, we will know that such an initial sequence will provide us with a useful upper
threshold for the edit distance and even in many cases, such a sequence will be a mini-
mum edit distance sequence.
The specific cut sets that we have used for the numerical results shown in this work
are defined as follows. Each cut set Ci+ j,2 ≤ i+ j ≤ N−1 contains:
1. The set of all the arcs corresponding to the vertex x i+ j.
2. All those edges corresponding to bits xw with w > i+ j whose output vertex is one
of the output vertices of the former set.
For the first model, these cut sets may be characterized by several independent con-
ditions on the intercepted sequence Y that may be used to guarantee a decrease on the
edit distances of different candidate sequences X . After having checked each hypothesis
separately, the tools used to check both sets of conditions on candidate sequences X are
described in terms of a pattern that is made out of independent bits of X according to
the formulas in Equation (2).
If ∀ j : 2,3, . . . ,N−M+1; y1 = y2 = · · ·= y j then y j = x1 = x2 = · · ·= x j+N−M
If ∀ j : N−M+2,N−M+3, . . . ,M;yM−N+ j = · · ·= y j−1 = y j then y j = x j = x j+1 =
· · ·= x j+N−M
If ∀ j : M + 1,M + 2, . . . ,N − 1; yM−N+ j = · · · = yM−1 = yM then yM = x j = x j+1 =
· · ·= xN
(2)
For the second model, the cut sets may be characterized by different independent
conditions on the intercepted sequence X that may be used to guarantee a decrease
on the edit distances of candidate sequences Y . After having checked each hypothesis
separately, the tools used to check both sets of conditions on candidate sequences Y are
described in terms of a pattern that is made out of independent bits of Y according to
the formulas in Equation (3).
If ∀ j : 2,3, . . . ,N−M+1; x1 = x2 = · · ·= x j+N−M then x1 = y1 = y2 = · · ·= y j
If ∀ j : N −M +2,N −M+3, . . . ,M;x j = x j+1 = · · · = x j+N−M then x j = yM−N+ j =
· · ·= y j−1 = y j
If ∀ j : M+1,M+2, . . . ,N −1;x j = x j+1 = · · ·= xN then x j = yM−N+ j = · · ·= yM
(3)
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For checking previous equations (2) and (3), it is necessary to determine the value
of N, which depends on k that is the maximum length of possible runs of decimations.
For example, if k = 1, then N = 3M/2, which is the mathematical expectation of N in
such a case.
Note that the checking procedure of hypothesis described with the previous Equa-
tions, applied on the intercepted sequence takes polynomial time as it implies a simple
verification of runs. The previous patterns allow discovering promising initial states
producing sequences with a low edit distance. In fact, such a pattern provides a good
quality threshold for the method that will be described in the following Section.
4 Attack Algorithm
The threshold obtained through the pattern described in the previous Section is a funda-
mental ingredient of the general attack described below. The algorithm here developed
also makes use of a new concept, the so-called stop column, which leads to a consider-
able saving in the computation of the edit distance matrices. Indeed, a stop column with
respect to a threshold T may be defined as a column j0 of the edit distance matrix W
such that each one of their elements fulfills the Equation (4).
wi, j0 > T − (N−M− i),∀i (4)
Once a minimum edit distance threshold has been obtained, we may use such a
threshold to stop the computation of any matrix W as soon as a stop column has been
detected. This is due to the fact that the edit distance corresponding to the candidate
initial state will be worse than the threshold. In this simple way, two new improve-
ments on the original attack may be achieved. On the one hand, as yet mentioned, the
computation of any matrix may be stopped as soon as a stop column is obtained. On
the other hand and thanks to the association between bits x i+ j and edges of the graph,
we may define an anti-pattern on the initial states of the target LFSR, the so-called
IS−anti− pattern. This new parameter allows us to discard the set of initial states ful-
filling such an IS− anti− pattern when an early stop column has been detected. This
is so because once a stop column has been obtained, it is possible to discard directly all
the initial states whose first bits coincide with those that produce the stop column. In
order to take full advantage of stop columns, it is convenient to have some efficient way
of obtaining a good threshold. That is exactly the effect of the pattern described in the
previous Section.
Since it is possible that the described pattern correspond only to sequences that may
not be produced by the target LFSR, in practice it is convenient to restrict the pattern
to the length of the target LFSR. So, the pattern obtained from the first formulas of
Equations (2) and (3) limited to the length of the target LFSR is what we call IS−
pattern. On the other hand, although sequences generated through the IS− pattern
have minimum edit distance, it is possible that the corresponding obtained decimation
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or insertion sequences and noise sequences are not consistent with the description of the
attacked generator. This is the reason why the proposed algorithm includes a process
of hypothesis relaxation, which implies the successive complementation of bits of the
IS− pattern until getting a positive result.
Finally, since the IS− pattern is determined by the runs at the beginning of the in-
tercepted sequence, if no long run exists at the beginning of the sequence, initially the
algorithm discards the first bits in the intercepted sequence before a long run, and use
those discarded bits to confirm the result of the attack. This idea is expressed within the
algorithm by a parameter H ∈ [0,L], chosen by the attacker depending on its computa-
tional capacity (the greater capacity, the fewer H).
The full description of the proposed general edit distance attack is as follows.
Algorithm
Input: The intercepted keystream sequence and the feedback polynomial of the tar-
get LFSR of length L.
Output: The initial states of the target LFSR producing sequences with a low edit
distance with the intercepted sequence, and the corresponding decimation or insertion
sequence and noise sequence.
1. Verification of hypothesis on the intercepted sequence described in Equation (2) or
(3).
2. While fewer than H hypothesis are fulfilled, discard the first bit and consider the
resulting sequence as new intercepted sequence.
3. Definition of the IS− pattern according to the first L formulas in Equation (2) or
(3).
4. Initialization of the threshold T = N.
5. For each initial state fulfilling the IS− pattern, which has not been previously
rejected:
(a) Computation of the edit distance matrix, stopping after detecting a stop column
according to threshold T and Equation (4).
(b) Definition of the IS−anti− pattern and rejection of all initial states fulfilling
it.
(c) Updating of the threshold T .
6. For each initial state producing a sequence with minimum edit distance:
(a) Computation of the shortest paths from the graph induced by the edit distance
matrix.
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(b) Translation from each shortest path into decimation or insertion sequences and
noise sequences.
(c) Checking that the obtained decimation or insertion sequences, and noise se-
quences are consistent with the attacked generator. Otherwise, updating of the
IS− pattern by complementing one of the bits in the original IS− pattern.
Note that if the output is not the minimum edit distance sequence, the obtained edit
distance can be used as threshold for the stop column method in order to find such a
sequence quickly.
5 Cryptanalysis of Shrinking and Alternating Step Generators
In this Section a specific implementation of the general attack presented in the previous
Section for the cases of the SG and the ASG is considered.
One of the first questions that have to be taken into account in both cases is the
limitation on the number of consecutive deletions because the longest run of consecutive
deletions in X to get Y is always shorter than the length LS of the selector register S.
This restriction implies that the equation (1) corresponding to the computation of the
edit distance matrix should be modified in the following way:
wi,1 = Pi(xi+1,y1), i = 0, . . . ,LS
w0, j = w0, j−1 +P0(x j,y j), j = 2, . . . ,M
wi,1 = ∞, i = LS +1, . . . ,N−M
wi, j = mink=0,...,LS−1{wi−k, j−1 +Pk(xi+ j,y j)}, i = 1, . . . ,N −M, j = 2, . . . ,M
Pk(xi+ j,y j) =
{
k if xi+ j = y j
k+1 if xi+ j = y j k = 0, ...,LS −1
(5)
Equations (2) and (3) corresponding to the definition of the pattern in the first and
the second model, respectively must be also adapted to the SG and the ASG, producing
the Equations (6) and (7) respectively:
If ∀ j : 2,3, . . . ,N−M+1;y1+ j/LS = · · ·= y j−1 = y j then y j = xLS( j/LS) = xLS( j/LS)+1 =
· · ·= xLS( j/LS)+LS−1
If ∀ j : N−M+2,N−M+3, . . . ,M;yM−N+ j = · · ·= y j−1 = y j then y j = x j = x j+1 =
· · ·= x j+LS−1
If ∀ j : M + 1,M+ 2, . . . ,N − 1; yM−N+ j = · · · = yM−(N− j)/LS then yM = x j = x j+1 =
· · ·= xmin( j+LS−1,N)
(6)
2993Caballero-Gil P., Fuster-Sabater A., Hernandez-Goya C.: Graph-Based Approach ...
If ∀ j : 2,3, . . . ,N−M+1;xLS( j/LS) = xLS( j/LS)+1 = · · ·= xLS( j/LS)+LS−1 then xLS( j/LS) =
y1+ j/LS = · · ·= y j−1 = y j
If ∀ j : N −M+ 2,N−M+ 3, . . . ,M;x j = x j+1 = · · · = x j+LS−1 then x j = yM−N+ j =
· · ·= y j−1 = y j
If ∀ j : M+1,M+2, . . . ,N −1; x j = x j+1 = · · · = xmin( j+LS−1,N) then x j = yM−N+ j =
· · ·= yM−(N− j)/LS
(7)
Finally, the process of hypothesis relaxation explained in the last Section must also
be used for the cases of SG and ASG when the minimum obtained edit distance is greater
than N−M since it corresponds to the presence of noise.
The following toy example is used simply to show some of the most remarkable
aspects of the proposal.
Example :
Let us assume that an attacker has intercepted the keystream sequence Y :1011110
of length M=7 produced by a SG, and knows the following parameters:
– LS = 3 and LA = 7
– PS(x) = 1+ x+ x3 and PA(x) = 1+ x+ x7
If we consider H = 3, after the verification of hypothesis from Equation (2) on the
intercepted sequence we find that none of them is fulfilled, so we discard the first bit
and check the hypothesis on the resulting sequence. In the sequence of length 6 only
two hypotheses are fulfilled, so again we discard the first bit and consider the result-
ing sequence as new intercepted sequence Y :11110 of length M=5 because it fulfills 3
hypothesis.
If we consider N=10, the IS− pattern according to the first formulas in Equation
(2) corresponding to the cut sets shown in Fig. 6 for this new sequence X is given by
IS− pattern: 111111x
Given Y :11110, for each initial state fulfilling the IS− pattern, the edit distance
matrix is computed:
– Initial state: 1111110, X :1111110101 and W =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 − −
1 1 1 1 −
2 2 2 2 −
− 3 3 4 4
− 4 5 4 4
− − 5 6 6
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
The threshold is updated by the edit distance T = 5
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Figure 6: Cut sets
– Initial state: 1111111,X :1111111010 and W =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 − −
1 1 1 1 −
2 2 2 2 −
− 3 3 3 3
− 4 4 5 5
− − 6 5 5
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
For both initial states we get the same minimum edit distance N −M=5. However,
when we recover the shortest paths from the source to the sink in the graphs induced
by the edit distance matrices, we get the following. On the one hand, in the first case,
the shortest paths correspond to non-possible decimation sequences according to the
parameters of the attacked generator. On the other hand, the second initial state pro-
vides fifty-four shortest paths, and only two of them correspond to possible decimation
sequences S: 0011101001 and S:1001110100 that are consistent with PS. However, if
we try to confirm these solutions with the first two discarded bits of the intercepted
sequence, we get that none of them are consistent with those bits.
Consequently, according to the algorithm, the IS− pattern has to be updated by
complementing any of the bits in the original IS− pattern. For instance, consider the
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new IS− pattern: 111110x. For this new IS− pattern again there exist two initial states
fulfilling the IS− pattern for which minimum edit distances equal to 5 are computed.
However, only the second initial state 1111101 provides a valid decimation sequence
S: 0011101001 that is consistent both with the parameters of the generator and with
discarded bits, so this solution is accepted as a valid solution for the cryptanalysis. On
the other hand, if we update the IS− pattern by complementing for instance the first bit
instead of the last bit, we obtain another new IS− pattern: 011111x, and the resulting
initial state and decimation sequence are 0111111 and S:0100111010, respectively.
In conclusion, the attack of this example has been successful alter the evaluation of
only 4, out of 128, promising initial states.
6 Experimental Implementation
The next table shows some results for experimental sequential implementations of the
algorithm against shrunken sequences. The columns denoted Seq.p. display the number
of sequences that fulfill the IS− pattern. Cases marked with * indicate the existence of
initial states fulfilling the IS− pattern and producing sequences X that are solutions.
Thres. and Dist. are the columns where the obtained threshold and the minimum edit
distance are shown.
From these randomly generated examples, we may deduce a general classification
of inputs into several cases. The best ones correspond to IS− patterns which directly
identify solutions. On the contrary, bad cases are those ‘missing the event’ cases in
which the IS− pattern fails to identify any correct initial state. Such cases are generally
associated with long runs at the beginning of the sequences Y . Finally, the medium
cases are those for which, despite the non existence of solutions fulfilling the pattern, a
good threshold is obtained. Such cases allow a good percentage of saving in computing
thanks to the detection of many early stop columns.
From the obtained results and the relationship between LA and Seq.pat. we may
deduce that the proposed algorithm produces the solution in O(2 LA/2) time instead of
the O(2LA) time corresponding to the exhaustive search that implied the original attack
[Pet 2004]. Furthermore, it is clear that the worst outputs appear when the initial results
in steps 1 to 4 are not adequate as there are no initial states fulfilling the IS− pattern.
However, even in these cases that require more computation, it is guaranteed that the
solution is always obtained.
Note that as aforementioned, the proposed algorithm not always output the mini-
mum edit distance sequence (cases that are here denoted by an *) but however, since
the hypothesis on Y are independent, the groups of bits in the IS− pattern are also in-
dependent and consequently, the conditions might be considered separately in such way
that we might define in this way a relaxed IS− pattern which might lead to sequences
that fulfill them. In addition, empirical results have shown that intercepted sequences Y
with short runs at the beginning cause a greater improvement in the time complexity of
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(N,M) LA 2LA Seq.p. Thres. Dist.
(20,15) 7 128 0 - 5
(30,20) 9 512 1 11 10
(33,22) 7 128 2* 12 12
(75,50) 7 128 8 29 27
(150,100) 9 512 32 57 55
(300,200) 11 248 128 166 164
(300,200) 13 8192 128 115 114
(450,300) 13 8192 128 176 171
(450,300) 14 16384 1024 173 171
(450,300) 16 65536 256 173 171
(750,500) 14 16384 1024* 291 291
Table 1: Results of experimental implementations
the attack. Thus, another way to avoid a bad behaviour of the original algorithm is by
choosing sub-sequences from the intercepted sequence Y that have no too long runs at
the beginning, and by applying the algorithm to each one of these sub-sequences.
7 Conclusions
A new graph-based approach to a known-plaintext cryptanalysis of LFSR-based stream
ciphers has been proposed in this paper. In particular, an improvement of the edit dis-
tance attack on certain irregularly clocked Linear LFSR has been described.
Our divide-and-conquer proposal has a lower computational complexity than the
original attack because it does not require the exhaustive search over all the possible
initial states of the target LFSR. The proposed heuristic optimization is based on the
characterization of certain directed graphs where optimal paths provide cryptanalytic
results. Also the definition of cut sets on such graphs allows getting useful thresholds
to identify the most promising branches of the search graph.
The strongest aspects of our proposal are the facts that the obtained results from the
attack are completely deterministic, and that many inconsistent initial states of the target
LFSRs are recognized and avoided during search. The proposed idea of using cut sets
to improve edit distance attacks might be also used against generalized clock-controlled
LFSR-based generators.
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